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Abstract  
n the wake of the recent global financial crisis, the banking industry has come under heavy 
criticism for the negative externalities imposed on the economy and society. The distress of 
the financial system during the financial crisis has triggered public discussions about the role 
of bank capital structures in the stability of banking institutions. While it was previously 
thought that regulatory capital requirements are the sole determinant of bank capital structure, 
recent empirical studies suggest that, instead, the standard cross-sectional determinants that 
explain the capital structures of non-financial firms also apply to banks. The findings from 
these studies prompt further investigation into what other factors determine the capital structure 
of banks. More recently, engagement in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities has 
emerged as a vital dimension through which firms develop sustainable strategies that affect 
overall firm performance.  In addition, the subsequent reporting of CSR performance has 
become increasingly important as more investors incorporate information about the social 
behaviour of firms in their investment decisions. This suggests that CSR has implications for 
the financing policies of firms. In light of the development of CSR as a relevant concept in the 
current corporate environment and especially in the banking industry, the goal of this study is 
to investigate whether CSR is a determinant of the capital structure of banks through a multiple 
regression analysis of panel data from 2009 to 2018 for a sample of 28 Global Systemically 
Important Banks. Using DataStream Refinitv ESG scores to proxy for CSR, the first hypothesis 
proposes that socially responsible banks tend to be less leveraged than those that are socially 
irresponsible due to the positive influence on equity financing from the lower costs of capital, 
informational asymmetries and risk associated with good CSR performance. The second 
hypothesis examines the effect of bank size on the proposed relationship.  Initial results indicate 
no significant relation between aggregate CSR and bank leverage, however, further analysis 
shows a significant negative relationship between the governance dimension of CSR and bank 
capital structure, suggesting that the governance structures of banks are more relevant for bank 
capital structure decisions. Bank size is found to have no effect on the relationship. The findings 
from this study have important implications that are particularly relevant in today’s financial 
environment as calls for the restoration of public trust in banking institutions accelerate.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
 anks are highly leveraged institutions and while this is an inherent part of the business 
of banking, excessive leverage can have evident negative consequences that undermine 
the broader financial and economic systems. In fact, over-leverage in the banking industry was 
recognised as being the underlying cause of the recent global financial crisis (GFC) (Basel 
Committee on Bank Supervision [BCBS], 2014:1). Furthermore, high levels of leverage have 
been known to incentivise banks to take extreme risks that increase their risk profiles and 
consequently threaten the solvency of these banks (Li, 2017:102; Bhaghat, Bolton & Lu, 
2015:521). This problem is especially true for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). 
Since they are deemed to be too systemically important to fail and are protected by too-big-to 
fail policies, they can always expect to be bailed out by the government. This creates a moral 
hazard situation where banks are incentivised to engage in higher risk activities in pursuit of 
greater returns. Such risk-taking behaviour concentrates risks to the banking sector and thus 
affects the fragility of the entire financial system, making future crises more likely (Bongini, 
Nieri & Pelagatti, 2015:562). 
Central to the discussion on the soundness of banks and a source of stability in the financial 
system is bank capital. The indefinite maturity of capital is particularly important as it provides 
a stable source of financing that allows banks to withstand financial and economic shocks 
(Berger, Herring & Szegö, 1995:408). Furthermore, since banks rely on the public’s perception 
about their health and safety to stabilise core deposit funding, a strong capital base can also 
boost public confidence in these institutions and reduce the possibility of an infectious bank 
run (Taggart & Greenbaum 1978:159).  
As a result of the link between the leverage levels of banks, bank capital and overall financial 
stability, the capital structures of banks are a key target for regulation which has led to the 
commonly held view that capital requirements are binding, thus making regulation the primary 
determinant of banks' choice of capital levels (Berger et al., 1995:419).  Interestingly, however, 
recent empirical studies suggest that the standard cross-sectional determinants of the capital 
structures of non-financial firms also extend to banks. The most prevalent contribution in this 
regard has been drawn from Gropp and Heider (2010:587) whose findings lay the foundation 
for the study of bank capital structure within a general capital structure framework (Sorokina 
et al., 2017:37). Based on the work of Frank and Goyal (2009:1), the study helps to identify 
variables that reliably explain bank capital structures. Taking this into account and in light of 
B 
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the systemic risk inherent in the banking sector, the importance of banks to global economic 
and social systems as well as their unique financial features, there are strong grounds to study 
the capital structure of banks.  
Like Sorokina (2017:36), this study extends the literature on the determinants of bank capital 
structure by adopting a model similar to those used in previous capital structure studies and 
augmenting it to include the effect of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on bank capital 
structure. This is because CSR has become an increasingly important part of the overall strategy 
of most firms as they work to legitimise their existence according to society’s standards. 
Moreover, the last few decades have also seen a growing number of investors account for the 
social and environmental performance of firms when making investment decisions (El Ghoul 
et al., 2011:2390; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009:16). This suggests that the implementation of 
CSR has consequences for the financing policies of firms. While existing theory and research 
has established links between the firm’s investment in CSR policies and its financing decisions, 
to the best of the author’s knowledge these studies generally do not investigate the influence 
of CSR on the capital decisions of banks. Therefore, the goal of this study is to fill this gap in 
the literature. 
As discussed above, the capital structures of banks can be greatly relevant to the stability of 
the banking sector thus understanding the drivers of bank capital decisions is crucial. This is 
especially relevant for G-SIBs due to the systemic impact their decisions and activities can 
have on the rest of the financial and economic systems. Accordingly, this paper probes into the 
following questions; 
1. What are the theoretical and empirical links that guide the relationship between CSR 
and the capital structure of firms? 
2. Are CSR and bank capital structure related?  
3. If so, what influence does the size of the banks have on this relationship? 
By so doing, this study seeks to contribute to the existing, but limited literature on the 
determinants of bank capital structure. Knowledge gained about CSR in the banking industry 
and its relation to bank capital structure from this study should provide useful insights for future 
regulatory policies that aim to reduce the probability of the bank failures and thus limit the 
negative externalities imposed by large international banks on society. The results of this study 
should also help to shed light on whether banks are heeding to societal concerns and hence 
working to restore credibility and public confidence in the financial system. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows; Section 2 provides a more elaborate 
discussion on the relevant literature regarding capital structure theories and empirical findings 
of the variables that are believed to influence the capital structures of firms and thus of banks. 
Furthermore, the paper discusses the concept of CSR in the banking industry and presents 
theoretical and empirical arguments that motivate the expectation of a relationship between the 
CSR performance of banks and their capital structures. Section 3 describes the research 
approach adopted for this study, including the methodology and data. Section 4 reports and 
analyses the results and findings of the regression tests. Finally, Section 5 concludes with 
discussions on the limitations of the study and the areas identified for future research. 
 
Section 2: Literature Review 
his section provides an analysis of the relevant background on the capital structure 
decisions of firms and the social responsibilities of the banking industry. It begins with a 
discussion on the theoretical principles underlying capital structure and discusses the 
empirical findings of firm-level characteristics that determine the capital decisions of non-
financial firms as a context for bank capital structure. It then proceeds with an overview of 
CSR, including its application and relevance to the banking industry. Finally, the section 
concludes with a review of the theoretical predictions and previous empirical researches on the 
impact of CSR participation on firms’ capital structures. From this review, the hypotheses of 
the study are developed. 
2.1  Capital Structure 
The capital structure of a firm refers to the way in which it finances its operations and assets, 
which usually involves a choice between various forms of debt and equity. Depending on the 
advantages and disadvantages of each form of financing, companies may choose to issue 
strictly debt or equity or a combination of both. Over the years, the subject has received a great 
deal of attention which has resulted in the development of formal theories and empirical studies 
that test the capital decisions of firms. Notably, banks have often been excluded from capital 
structure literature due to the belief that bank capital structure is primarily driven by regulation 
(Sorokina, Thornton Jr. & Patel, 2017:36). As a result, there exists very little literature on the 
determinants of banks’ capital structures. 
T 
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While past theoretical research on the capital structure of banks has generally been limited to 
the existence of an optimal capital ratio (De Jonghe & Öztekin, 2015:154), a few empirical 
studies that examine whether capital requirements are the sole determinant of banks’ capital 
structures have recently emerged. In a leading study by Gropp and Heider (2010:587), the 
authors hypothesise that mispriced deposit insurance and capital regulation are secondary 
determinants of bank capital structure and that, instead, the standard cross-sectional 
determinants of non-financial firms also explain banks’ capital structure, except for banks that 
hold levels of capital that are close to the regulatory minimum. Using a sample of 200 large, 
publicly listed American and European banks over the period 1991 to 2004, they find that the 
sign and significance of the effect of the standard determinants observed under empirical 
studies on the capital structure of non-financial firms also apply to banks. Furthermore, they 
refute the notion that the high levels of discretionary capital observed in the banking industry 
can be explained by the buffers held by banks to guard against falling below the minimum 
capital requirements.  In a similar study, Teixeira et al. (2014:34) extend Gropp and Heider 
(2010:587)’s study by examining banks’ excess equity capital based on the observation that, 
on average, banks hold capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. They extend the period 
used by Gropp and Heider (2010:587) from 2004 to 2010 and based on a larger sample of 560 
American and European banks, they also find that factors that determine the capital structure 
of non-financial firms play a similar role in explaining banks’ capital structures. Further 
investigation on the determinants of banks’ equity capital reveals that the buffer view of banks’ 
capital structure is also not validated. Overall, these studies relegate capital regulation and the 
buffer view of capital to secondary importance and suggest that standard capital structure 
literature explains the capital structures of banks.  
2.1.1 Capital Structure Theories 
Much of the literature on modern capital structure theories begins with the seminal 
contributions made by Modigliani and Miller. Their first proposition, often referred to as the 
capital structure irrelevance theorem, states that the capital decisions of a firm have no bearing 
on its value, therefore, managers cannot alter the value of a company by changing its level of 
leverage (Modigliani & Miller, 1958:268). In formulating this proposition, they assume that 
there are no arbitrage opportunities and so they theorise the absence of taxes, information 
asymmetries as well as agency and bankruptcy costs. This implies that the value of a levered 
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firm is equivalent to the value of an unlevered firm. Accordingly, investors would be indifferent 
about buying into two identical firms that differ only by their choice of capital structure.  
In their second paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963:433) relax their assumptions to introduce 
corporate taxes and acknowledge that taxes provide an additional source of value owing to the 
tax deductibility of the interest expense associated with debt financing.  The tax treatment of 
the interest charges reduces the firm’s income tax liabilities and results in more free cashflows 
due to the increase in profits after tax (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973:911), thus the value of the 
firm should increase in proportion to the amount of debt used. This suggests that, in order to 
maximise the firm’s value, firms ought to take advantage of this tax benefit by accumulating 
as much debt as possible. However, in practice, as firms approach a pure debt capital structure, 
the interest expense paid on debt financing increases to compensate the suppliers of debt for 
the additional risk of leverage above what they deem as acceptable (Simon, 1963:276). In 
addition, Baxter (1967:397) explains that an increase in debt above a certain level induces the 
risks of financial distress because of the volatility of the expected earnings and as a result, the 
firm’s average cost of capital will increase. Therefore, the author argues that no rational firm 
will choose to finance its assets using exclusively debt when it can do so by using its existing 
mix of debt and equity at a cheaper cost of capital.  
Modigliani and Miller’s propositions have influenced the emergence of a vast amount of 
theoretical and empirical research on corporate financing decisions. Succeeding literature on 
capital structure presents two main influential theories that emanate from the departures of 
these classical papers; the trade-off theory and pecking order theory (Myers, 2001:82).  
The trade-off theory is considered to be an extension of Modigliani and Miller (1963)’s 
propositions since it suggests that there is a mix of debt and equity finance that maximises the 
tax advantages of debt while minimising the costs of financial distress that arise from possible 
bankruptcy. The theory proposes that the capital structure of a firm is thus driven by the need 
to balance the marginal benefits and marginal costs of borrowing in order to maximise the 
value of the firm (Jensen 1986:324). This “trade-off” implies that there is a threshold level of 
debt and hence an optimal capital structure that maximises the firm’s market value (Stulz, 
1990:4). Several studies have shown the existence of an optimal capital structure in accordance 
with this theory and confirm that firms make the choice between different levels of debt and 
equity to adjust their capital structure toward their target leverage ratios. For instance, 
Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian (2004:519) observe that firms are deliberate in issuing 
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both debt and equity, suggesting a target capital structure, and that deviations are offset to keep 
the financing structure close to the target. Using a partial adjustment model of firm leverage, 
Flannery and Rangan (2006:471) also find that non-financial firms target a long run target 
capital structure and estimate that deviations from the desired levels of leverage tend to be 
reversed quickly. 
As discussed, the benefit of debt finance provides an incentive for companies to borrow as 
much as possible in order to maximise the value of the debt tax shield. However, the increase 
in borrowing raises the cost of debt finance due to the higher risk of defaulting on interest 
payments and the accompanying costs of financial distress. This is because by its very nature, 
debt represents a legal financial obligation to make fixed payments to providers of debt as they 
become due, failing which, the firm may be declared insolvent and incur the associated 
bankruptcy costs (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973:911-912). According to Myers (1984:580), the 
costs of financial distress are a combination of the direct legal and administrative costs incurred 
in the event of a bankruptcy as well as the indirect costs that firms face due to the collapse of 
contractual relationships. These indirect costs may arise from the hesitancy of stakeholders to 
continue dealing with a firm that is experiencing operational disruptions because of financial 
constraints and is, therefore, unable to meet its contractual commitments (Baxter 1967:399). In 
addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976:334) identify the shareholder-debtholder conflict as the 
source of agency costs of debt. This conflict occurs because the availability of debt funds 
encourages shareholders to make suboptimal investment decisions at the expense of 
debtholders. Due to their limited liability, shareholders stand to benefit higher returns from 
risky investments but if they fail, the losses are borne by the debtholders (Harris & 
Raviv,1991:301). 
The pecking order theory is an alternative capital structure theory that is often regarded as an 
opponent of the trade-off theory (Frank & Goyal, 2003:19; Myers, 1984:581) and was 
developed from the works of Myers (1984:575) and Myers and Majluf (1984:187). It does not 
assume that firms have leverage targets, instead, it posits that in making decisions about how 
to finance investment opportunities, firms usually prefer internal capital to external capital. 
This preference results from the information costs and adverse selection issues that arise due 
to the information asymmetry that exists between managers and investors (Hovakimian et al., 
2004:518). As insiders of the firm, managers are generally believed to know more about the 
firm’s future profits and risks, hence its true value, than outsiders and therefore, their financing 
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decisions are thought to signal information about the prospects of the firm to investors (Myers, 
1977:148; Myers, 1984:575). 
The theory assumes that capital structure decisions are arranged such that the costs of adverse 
selection are minimised. Typically, adverse selection issues can be resolved using retained 
earnings, however, external sources of finance have adverse selection risk premiums that make 
them riskier and so raise financing costs (Frank and Goyal, 2003:220). Therefore, firms will 
opt to finance new projects using internally generated cashflows until they are exhausted and 
will only source funds externally when more capital is required. Since safer securities are issued 
before riskier ones, debt financing is generally preferred over equity. This is because the lower 
information costs associated with debt make borrowing relatively cheaper, thus in order to 
avoid the costs from the adverse signalling of equity issuances, new equity is only ever raised 
as a last resort (Myers & Majluf, 1984:203).  
Several empirical studies have tested the superiority of these two opposing theories. For 
instance, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999:219) test the pecking order theory against the trade-
off theory on a panel of 157 non-financial firms and find that amongst these firms the pecking 
order theory offers a better empirical explanation for the debt/equity choices of mature, public 
firms than the trade-off theory does. In contrast, the results from Frank and Goyal (2003:218) 
are inconsistent with the assumptions of the pecking order theory. Using a sample of 157 
publicly listed American firms, they find that equity as opposed to debt finance, accounts for a 
significant portion of firms’ external finance. In addition, their results show that the theory 
better explains the financing choices of larger rather than smaller firms. To date, research is 
yet to reach a consensus on which of the theories provides better explanatory power for 
corporate financing decisions and recently, the market signalling theory and market timing 
theory have also emerged as possible explanatory capital structure theories.  
2.1.2 Determinants of Capital Structure 
Over the years, capital structure literature has agreed on a common set of variables that have 
been observed to influence leverage levels. These are formally referred to as the determinants 
of capital structure. Among these variables, Rajan and Zingales 1995(1451) identifies the four 
core firm-specific factors (firm size, asset tangibility/collateral, profitability and 
growth/market-to-book ratio) that have repeatedly shown up as explanatory variables in 
empirical capital structure studies. According to Frank and Goyal (2003:223), these four factors 
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have survived various tests and therefore, play a significant role in explaining the capital 
structure decisions of firms.  
In assessing the impact of these factors on leverage, prior studies adopt alternative measures of 
leverage based on short-term, long-term and total debt. Short-term debt refers to the portion of 
firms’ total debt obligations (including deposits and current accounts in the case of banks) 
repayable within one year whereas long-term debt is the total debt repayable beyond one year. 
Total debt is the sum of short and long-term debt. Although Rajan and Zingales (1995:1429) 
argue that the most appropriate measure of leverage is based on total debt as it includes items 
which may be used for financing purposes rather than for transactions, Gropp and Heider 
(2010:603) note that much of the empirical research for non-financial firms use long-term debt 
in the leverage measure. Nonetheless, Frank and Goyal (2009:12) affirm that crucial results are 
largely robust to alternative definitions of leverage. Notably, the pecking order theory also 
makes predictions about the maturity and priority structure of debt and suggests that since 
securities with the lowest information costs will be issued first, short-term debt will be issued 
before long-term debt in event that external financing is needed (Frank & Goyal, 2003:219). 
Leverage can also be measured in book value or market value terms, however, Titman and 
Wessel (1988:7) state that there is very little difference between the two measures as they are 
closely correlated.  
The factors listed above and their effect on some form of leverage measure are discussed as 
follows; 
• Firm size 
The relationship between the size of a firm and leverage is typically viewed on the basis of its 
ability to diversify its business operations and in raising finance. However, there are conflicting 
theoretical expectations regarding the effect of firm size on leverage. In line with the trade-off 
theory, Titman and Wessels (1988:6) argue that larger firms face lower risks of bankruptcy or 
financial distress as they are usually more diversified, and this allows them to take on more 
debt without the concern of defaulting on future debt payments. Under the pecking order 
theory, financing costs increase with higher information asymmetries; the higher the 
asymmetries, the greater the risk to outside investors and this is reflected in the price of issued 
securities.  Rajan and Zingales (1995:1457) note that larger firms have lower informational 
asymmetries and are therefore expected to be less leveraged since they incur lower costs in 
issuing new equity. In addition, large firms tend to have credible reputations within debt 
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markets and are thus able to borrow easily and inexpensively because of lower information 
costs (Frank & Goyal,2003:224). Conversely, Marsh (1982:123) argues that due to issuance 
costs and pronounced difficulties in accessing capital markets, small companies often depend 
on bank loans for funding. This is supported by Titman and Wessels (1988:6) who state that 
the cost of issuing securities is related to the size of a firm and suggest that small firms may 
prefer debt to equity because of the higher expected costs of issuing new equity and somewhat 
of issuing long-term debt.  This suggests that small firms will not only be more leveraged but 
that they will prefer short-term debt over long-term debt due to the lower transaction costs 
associated with the former.  
• Asset Tangibility 
According to Titman and Wessels (1988:3) the asset structure of companies influences their 
capital structure decisions. Tangible assets such as property and machinery are generally visible 
to outside investors and hence easier to value than non-physical assets (Frank & Goyal, 
2009:9). This ease of valuation lowers distress costs and suggests that the greater the fraction 
of a company’s tangible assets, the higher the company’s liquidation value. Furthermore, 
tangible assets often serve as collateral in financing arrangements which reduces the agency 
costs of total debt and thus encourages borrowing (Rajan & Zingales, 1995:1451). Campello 
and Giambona (2013:1) extend the argument on collateral by considering the capacity of 
creditors to repossess assets when their debtors become delinquent. They find that assets that 
can be repossessed and easily disposed of offer more security to debt providers and so they are 
more willing to supply funds. Moreover, they report that generic assets such as land and 
buildings better support the capacity for borrowing since these assets can be redeployed. 
Altogether, these arguments suggest that leverage is positively correlated with the tangibility 
of corporate assets. 
• Profitability 
Although the financial performance of firms has been observed to drive their financing 
decisions, the effect of profitability on leverage also remains ambiguous. Profitability is a 
measure of asset productivity (Barton, Hill & Sundaram, 1989:40) and is synonymous with the 
firm’s ability to generate and retain income. Consequently, the pecking order theory predicts 
that profitable firms will be less leveraged since they are more likely to rely on internal 
cashflows to finance their assets. Debt is only issued when internal reserves have been depleted. 
This is consistent with the findings of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999:221) who state that the 
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firm’s debt levels are driven by the need for external finance and tend to grow with available 
investment opportunities. The more the opportunities, the greater the level of debt to cover the 
shortfall in cashflows initially met by retained earnings. Fama and French (2002:4) also find 
that leverage levels are generally low for more profitable firms with few investment 
opportunities. Likewise, findings from Titman and Wessels (1988:2), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995:1451) and Myers (2001:89) suggest a negative profitability-leverage relationship. On the 
other hand, the trade-off theory predicts that a positive relationship should exist between 
leverage and profitability since it posits that savings from the debt tax shield can lower income 
tax liabilities. This tax benefit is more valuable to profitable firms who are subject to higher 
taxes liabilities, thus in order to reduce their tax expenses, firms may take on more leverage 
(Frank & Goyal 2003:224; Frank & Goyal, 2009:7). Furthermore, the large amounts of free 
cashflows generated by highly profitable firms increase the agency costs of the conflict 
between managers and shareholders. In order to reduce these costs and the cashflows available 
for management spending, firms will issue more debt (Jensen,1986:324).  
• Growth 
A firm’s capacity to finance future opportunities is affected by its growth rate (Barton et al. 
1989:41). Growing firms have large financing needs due to the positive net present value 
(NPV) opportunities available to them. This places a greater demand than can be met on 
internal cashflows, and as a result firms often resort to external capital to fund the growth. 
Since the pecking order theory assumes that firms prefer to issue the safest security first when 
the need for external funding arises, it predicts that high growth firms will be more leveraged 
because of the reluctance to issue equity and implies that expected growth will be negatively 
related to long-term debt levels as growing firms will prefer short-term debt as the safer 
security. However, the trade-off theory counters this view point and instead argues that firms 
with high market-to-book ratios, which is often used as the proxy for growth opportunities 
(Frank & Goyal, 2009:8), are unlikely to take on debt as the chances of financial distress and 
the associated costs increase with expected growth. Myers (1977:149) supports this stance 
through an elaborate discussion on the high agency costs that arise from the sub-optimal 
behaviours of high growth firms. Furthermore, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001:2) argue 
that firms consist of both tangible and non-tangible assets in the form of growth opportunities. 
These opportunities are mostly funded by issuing equity to take advantage of the perceived 
value of their growth prospects whereas physical assets are funded using mostly debt. Frank 
and Goyal (2003:224) also emphasise the limitations placed on these firms’ ability to accept 
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positive NPV projects, causing them to pass up profitable investments. In general, empirical 
studies conclude that the relation between expected future growth and leverage is negative. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the theoretical predictions together with the findings from 
empirical research on capital structure decisions.  
Table 1: Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Findings of Capital Structure Determinants 
FACTORS / 
DETERMINANTS 
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS Pecking order theory Trade-off theory 
Firm size - + +/- 
Asset tangibility + - + 
Profitability - + +/- 
Growth + - - 
Source: Author’s own based on capital structure theories and empirical research studies 
The signs and significance of the effects of these determinants have also been found to apply 
to bank leverage (Gropp & Heider, 2010:589). Although not as reliable as the factors discussed 
above, several other factors have emerged in previous well-known capital structure studies as 
explanatory variables of firms’ capital structure. These include dividend payment, asset risk 
and taxes. Dividends are inversely related to debt as dividend paying firms have free cashflows 
and so are assumed to face fewer financial constraints. Asset risk is also inversely related to 
leverage because volatile returns give rise to financial distress so firms with volatile stocks tend 
to carry less debt (Frank & Goyal, 2009:9). Tax is positively related to leverage since higher 
tax rates encourage borrowing. Noticeably, CSR does not appear as one of the determinants. 
An overview of CSR and its recently established link to capital structure are discussed in the 
next subsection.  
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
The concept of CSR is hardly new, however, it has gained significant traction over the past few 
decades. The substantial increase in CSR investments, disclosure of CSR initiatives through 
published reports and research studies on the concept have cemented the importance of CSR 
in business literature (Malik, 2015:419). However, despite its growing relevance to the current 
business environment, there is no universal definition of CSR. The World Bank (2003:1) 
defines CSR as “the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic 
development, working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large 
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to improve quality of life, in ways that are both good for business and good for development”. 
In the same manner, the Commission of European Communities (2001:6) defines CSR as ‘‘a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.’’ Although the 
definitions of CSR vary, they all emphasise the firm’s responsibility for society and for creating 
value for all stakeholders (Perez & del Bosque, 2012:154). Overall, CSR is viewed as the 
additional efforts made by firms to promote sustainability via sound business operations (Cui, 
Jo & Na 2013 :549). 
According to Jizi et al. (2014:603), CSR can offer financial and strategic benefits by helping 
firms establish good reputations and relations with their stakeholders. Over the years, an 
increasing amount of CSR research has been dedicated to quantifying the consequences of the 
social and environmental performance of companies (Harjoto & Jo, 2015:2). The most 
common research question in this regard is related to the link between CSR and financial 
performance. To date, research conducted in this direction has produced inconclusive results 
among researchers (Girerd-Potin, Jimenez-Garcès & Louvet, 2014:560). In addition, a wide 
range of similar studies have focused on the other aspects of the firm, including corporate 
identity, corporate governance, earnings quality, firm value, firm risk, access to capital 
markets, cost of capital, information asymmetries etc. In spite of its benefits, CSR is subject to 
criticism. One of the earliest critics of CSR was the well-known economist, Milton Friedman, 
who famously believed that shareholder wealth maximization should be the sole objective of a 
firm (Hurley & Waqar, 2014:360). Since then, other opponents have also argued that the 
diversion of firm resources to meet social responsibilities ultimately distorts the purpose of the 
corporation. Other critiques tend towards firms’ reasons for investing in CSR. Sprinkle and 
Maines (2010:446) identify several of these reasons which include altruism, strategic motives 
and window-dressing, with firms being especially criticised for the latter.  
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that firms have responsibilities towards society (Malik 
2015:426). Despite the on-going debates about the legitimacy and financial implications of 
CSR, the increasing amount of theoretical developments and empirical investigations on the 
subject emphasise its significance in today’s modern business environment where firms are 
required to be socially responsible. Therefore, the concept of CSR will continue to be an 
essential part of academia and business management as it underlies many of the ethical and 
stakeholder-oriented theories and is consistent with societal expectations of the business 
community (Caroll, 1999:292).   
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2.2.1 CSR in the Banking Industry 
Unlike non-financial firms, the systemic effects posed by the actions of banks are what 
differentiates them from other firms and limiting this systemic effect is important for society 
(Stulz, 2016:47). It has already been established that the safety and financial soundness of the 
banking industry and the wider financial system generates benefits for society. To fulfil their 
financial intermediation role, banks rely substantially on the funds provided by society. For 
this reason, they are subject to intense public scrutiny and are required to provide feedback on 
their activities to the public more often than other industries (Wu & Shen 2013:3530). In 
response to the increasing pressure to acknowledge their social responsibility, banks are 
progressively engaging in voluntary disclosures of non-financial information via published 
sustainability reports to provide feedback on how they are faring as corporate citizens. In fact, 
the banking sector is recognised as being amongst the leading CSR investors, globally 
(Scholtens, 2006:19; Perez & del Bosque, 2012:160).  
The engagement of large international banks in controversial and socially irresponsible 
practices during the GFC caused the erosion of public trust in these institutions due to the 
negative effects imposed on the economy and society (Esteban-Sanchez, Cuesta-Gonzalez & 
Paredes-Gazquez 2017:1102). Therefore, it would appear that there is scope for extensive 
application of CSR in the banking industry. Wu and Sheng (2013:3531) note that one the most 
important ways to integrate CSR into the banking industry is through the role of bank 
reputation. According to Perez and de Bosque (2012:146), reputation building is highly 
relevant for firms that are perceived to be highly risky and are therefore, subject to intense 
monitoring. It thus becomes essential for these firms to provide supplementary non-financial 
information such as that on CSR, which is an important tool for influencing public image and 
is increasingly being sought after by stakeholders. This is especially relevant in the context of 
the heavily regulated and highly visible banking industry that is vulnerable to the public’s 
perception about its activities. Through improved reputations, banks adopting CSR can regain 
their credibility and thus attract more customers than non-CSR banks (Wu & Shen 2013: 3532).  
Likewise, socially responsible banking is also becoming a well-established concept in the 
financial services sector (Scholtens 2009:159). Through their roles as providers of financing, 
banks can be indirectly involved in the negative environmental and social activities undertaken 
by the firms they fund. Therefore, they may be keen to integrate CSR into their traditional 
screening and monitoring processes (Nizam et al., 2018:40). Since CSR is often perceived as a 
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risk to the financier, banks can incorporate this risk into their risk assessment procedures which 
ensures that finance is more easily available to businesses that contribute positively to social 
and environmental welfare, thus encouraging these firms to evaluate their own CSR strategies 
in order to qualify for funding. Scholtens (2009:161) argues that one of the weaknesses of 
applying CSR principles to the banking industry via this role is that it is of an “indirect, 
intermediate” nature and is thus only effective to a certain extent. Goss and Roberts 
(2011:1795) also contend that the small economic impact of concerns about the CSR ranking 
of borrowers on the interest spreads of bank loans suggests that banks view CSR risks as a 
second-order determinant of interest rates and that borrower quality depends more on the 
availability of collateral. At the same time, however, the authors note that there is evidence that 
banks view CSR concerns as risks and respond with less attractive lending terms (Benlemlih, 
2017:6).  
More recently, a few empirical works have investigated the link between CSR and the financial 
performance of banks but due to the limited number of studies so far, the results of studies 
conducted in this direction are inconclusive. Overall, these studies highlight the growing 
relevance of CSR and its financial implications in the banking industry. 
2.3 CSR and Capital Structure 
Much of the discussion so far has focused on capital structure and CSR in isolation. In this sub-
section, the theoretical links and empirical findings that support the existence of a relationship 
between CSR and capital structure are reviewed.   
2.3.1 Theories on CSR and Capital Structure 
According to Aras, Tezcan and Furtuna (2018:601), there are three main theories that relate to 
the CSR framework; the Legitimacy, Stakeholder and Agency theories.  The Legitimacy theory 
is related to the idea of a “social contract” where a firm’s survival depends on its ability and 
willingness to adhere to society’s perception of what is deemed as desirable behaviour in order 
to access the resources it requires to continue operating (Deegan, 2002:293). The theory 
suggests that firms do not have an inherent right to exist but require the granting of a “license 
to operate” by society (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013:14). Legitimacy thus becomes a resource that 
firms need to operate and if they are perceived not to be conducting their business in an 
acceptable manner, this resource and its accompanying license may be revoked (Deegan, 
2002:293). For instance, this may be evidenced by customer or supplier boycotts. Accordingly, 
firms that comply with societal expectations and consider themselves as good corporate 
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citizens will be eager to give feedback on their CSR activities as part of their legitimising 
strategy to justify their right to exist as well as to distinguish themselves from firms that do not 
meet society’s standards. This applies even more so in the case of banks as they depend on 
public perception regarding their soundness and the resources provided by the public to 
perform their most critical functions. Failure to uphold public confidence in the safety of the 
banking industry may give rise to crippling bank runs as witnessed during the GFC. Since 
depositors want banks to hold as much capital as possible, the legitimacy theory suggests that 
banks will account for their social responsibility by holding more capital in order to continue 
receiving the resources they require to operate. 
The Stakeholder theory is based on the existence of a diverse group of stakeholders that have 
an interest in the firm and are affected or can affect its operations. Hahn and Kühnen (2013:5) 
argue that the pursuit of different social, economic and environmental interests by these 
different groups of stakeholders can determine the success of a firm. Moreover, since firms 
rely on other stakeholders other than long-term shareholders for the supply of resources, the 
engagement of firms in CSR is not only of interest to its shareholders but to these other 
stakeholders as well. There is, therefore, an expectation for firms to balance the collective 
expectations of their stakeholders (Jizi et al., 2014:603). According to Barton et al. (1989:36), 
the Stakeholder theory can explain the behaviour of firms and thus be used to develop cross-
sectional predictions about the capital structure of firms. The authors view the firm as a 
collection of claims held by different stakeholders; the resources supplied by stakeholders are 
viewed as assets as they allow the firm to continue its business while explicit and implicit 
stakeholder claims are viewed as liabilities. The difference between the assets and liabilities 
defined in this way is referred to as the net organisational capital (NOC) and high levels of 
positive NOC, that is, when assets exceed liabilities, should lead firms to have relatively low 
levels of debt (Barton et al., 1989:43). 
Harjoto (2017:488) extends the stakeholder argument with reference to Jensen (2001:236)’s 
enlightened value maximising theory which posits that while meeting the needs of non-
investing stakeholders is important, the ultimate goal of managers is to increase the long-term 
future value for both investing and non-investing stakeholders, that is, there is a trade-off 
between the resources used to fund CSR activities and the provision of long-term value for all 
stakeholders through CSR.  Based on this theory, the authors argue that there are costs 
associated with engaging in CSR activities to satisfy non-investing stakeholders. Therefore, if 
CSR expenditure is expected to increase operating costs more than the expected gain in total 
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contribution margin then CSR will increase the firm’s pre-tax cost of doing business which 
will in turn reduce the firm’s pre-tax income. In this way, CSR expenditure is viewed as a 
substitute for the debt tax shield, especially when debt levels are low. It can be thus concluded 
that firms that invest in CSR tend to reduce debt financing, resulting in a negative relation 
between CSR and financial leverage. 
The Agency theory is primarily concerned with the conflicts that arise between managers, 
shareholders and debtholders and the related agency costs. Bae, Kang and Wang (2011:131) 
use Jensen (1986:323)’s analysis on the agency costs of free cashflows to link the firm’s CSR 
initiatives and its capital structure.  The authors argue that since the availability of large free 
cashflows incentivise managers to invest beyond optimal levels in pursuit of their own benefit, 
high levels of leverage can curb such behaviour. They assume that firms with larger free 
cashflows are likely to have more resources to invest in CSR initiatives than those with fewer 
free cashflows, consequently these firms are likely to invest in CSR even if these initiatives do 
not maximise shareholders’ wealth. If debt is to serve as a disciplinary tool in preventing 
management from diverting free cashflows to inefficient investments, then high leverage is 
expected to control for overinvestment in CSR. This suggests that the relationship between 
leverage and CSR would be negative. Furthermore, Aras et al. (2018:601) argue that CSR 
reporting can reduce informational asymmetries between a firm and its stakeholders and 
alleviate agency problems. Wu and Shen, (2013:3532) draw the same conclusions regarding 
the voluntary CSR disclosures by banks. They state that banks with proper CSR programs are 
able to reduce information asymmetries with stakeholders and obtain the support of society 
through CSR reporting. Therefore, investors are more willing to invest in banks that achieve 
good CSR performance and report on their CSR activities.  
To summarise, while all the theories discussed above explain how the engagement in and 
reporting of CSR activities can affect financing decisions, the Agency theory further explains 
why CSR firms are likely to attract more investors than non-CSR firms. Wu and Shen 
(2013:3529) further discuss the driving motives of bank’s engagement in CSR and based on 
the three motives of strategic choice, altruism and greenwashing, they find that the strategic 
motive is the primary driver of the CSR activities of banks. By adopting CSR in this manner, 
banks can still create a mutually beneficial situation for both shareholder and stakeholder 
groups. Overall, these three theories provide a basis for the theoretical prediction of a 
relationship between CSR and capital structure. Specifically, they suggest that firms and thus 
banks would be expected to account for societal concerns in their capital decisions.  The rest 
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of the discussion continues with the empirical findings that further support the predicted 
relationship. 
2.3.2 Empirical studies on CSR and capital structure 
In evaluating the financial value of CSR, most studies focus on accounting and market-based 
performance measures. Consequently, only a few CSR studies are related to the capital markets 
(El Ghoul et al., 2011:2389). The previous discussion on the pecking order theory illustrated 
that information asymmetry and cost of capital are closely related to the capital structure of 
firms. Several empirical works discuss these concepts in the context of CSR. Benlemlih 
(2017:2) provides a systematic review of some of these studies in relation to the financing 
decisions of firms and asserts that the related literature suggests a relationship between CSR 
and capital structure. 
As previously stated, Modigliani and Miller’s propositions assume that under perfect capital 
markets there is information symmetry, however, in reality managers have more information 
about the firm’s activities than outsiders. There is unison agreement in the corporate world 
about the value of information other than that presented in the financial statements. Cho, Lee 
and Pfeiffer Jr. (2013:72) contend that investors are particularly interested in information 
regarding the CSR engagements of firms. Furthermore, investors now incorporate the 
commitment of firms to environmental and social responsibility into their investment decisions 
(El Ghoul et al., 2011:2390; Jizi et al, 2014:603). The disclosure of additional non-financial 
information is thus important to investors as well as to other stakeholders as it provides a more 
complete view of the company. 
 Several empirical studies suggest that CSR reporting affects the level of information 
asymmetry between the firm and its stakeholders. Using the issuance of stand-alone CSR 
reports and the accuracy of analysts’ forecast as proxies for CSR performance and information 
asymmetry, respectively, Dhaliwal et. al (2012:59) observe that the disclosure of CSR 
information is significantly associated with a reduction in forecast errors and thus gives a good 
signal to different stakeholders about the value of additional non-financial information 
disclosed by the firms. Furthermore, the association is amplified for countries that are more 
stakeholder-oriented and whose financial performance is likely to be more affected by CSR 
performance (Dhaliwal et. al, 2012:752). In a similar study, Cho et al. (2013:71) instead use 
CSR scores from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini database (KLD STAT) and bid-offer 
spreads as the relevant proxies. They argue that both positive and negative CSR performance 
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(as measured by the scores) provide information that seemingly reduces information 
asymmetry, with the negative CSR performance having a much stronger influence in reducing 
the bid-offer spreads. In addition, they posit that this effect differs for investors who do not 
possess the same levels of information based on the fact that more-informed institutional 
investors, who usually have access to private information, utilise it in a manner that lowers the 
reduction in asymmetry. Overall, their results suggest that CSR performance is beneficial to 
investors and that regulatory intervention may be required to resolve the adverse selection 
issues faced by less-informed investors.  
According to Lopatta, Buchholz and Kaspereit (2016:482), firms that engage in CSR activities 
enjoy the benefit of low informational asymmetries. This is because a firm’s commitment to 
socially responsible behaviour contributes to its trustworthiness which means it is less likely to 
conceal information. The authors rely on the abnormal returns from insider transactions for 
firms listed on the MSCI World index as a proxy for information asymmetry to show that firms 
with a high CSR scores achieve lower abnormal returns, suggesting an inverse relation between 
CSR performance and information asymmetry (Lopatta et al.,2016:458). In a more recent study 
based on the public equity market in America, Cui, Jo and Na (2018:549) argue that the 
negative relation is more significant for high-risk firms, indicating the extra efforts made by 
managers to reduce information asymmetries and avoid selection issues through the voluntary 
disclosure of CSR information. Moreover, they find that their results are consistent with the 
stakeholder theory which views CSR engagements and disclosures as channels through which 
firms can better communicate with stakeholders and thus build and maintain their reputations. 
Consequently, they conclude that CSR engagements are negatively associated with 
reputational risk which in turn lowers information asymmetry.  
Based on the findings of these studies, there appears to be convincing evidence that the 
disclosure of CSR activities contributes to a reduction in information asymmetry and thus plays 
a positive role in the decisions of investors. In the same accord, CSR appears to have 
implications for the cost of capital. According to La Rosa et al. (2018:519), the cost of capital 
can indicate CSR risks and benefits. Furthermore, as a key input to analyst forecasts and 
investment decisions, the cost of capital is a tool that capital markets can use to incentivise 
social responsibility amongst firms (Henkiel, Kraus & Zechner (2001:431). This would imply 
that socially irresponsible firms face higher costs of capital. Empirical discussions on the 
relationship between CSR and the cost of financing are divided between the two sources of 
external capital, that is, equity and debt. 
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El Ghoul et al. (2011:2389) study the effect of social responsibility on the ex-ante cost of equity 
for firms in America and hypothesise that the cost of equity is lower for firms with high CSR 
scores because firms with low CSR scores have a higher perceived risk and thus a smaller 
investor base. They find this to be the case and observe that employee relations, environmental 
policies, and product strategies are the greatest contributors to the reduction in the equity 
financing costs. Their results also suggest that firms in ‘‘sin industries” such as tobacco and 
nuclear power have very high equity costs. Likewise, Dhaliwal, Li and Yang (2011:59) show 
that firms with high costs of capital are not only able to realise a reduction in their cost of equity 
capital by initiating voluntary disclosure of social performance, but they also attract increased 
institutional ownership and analyst coverage. Sharfman and Fernando (2008:570) also provide 
evidence that financial markets reward better management of environmental risks through a 
lower cost of equity since it contributes to the soundness of overall risk management. This 
makes intuitive sense since the cost of capital typically reflects the level of risk associated with 
a company. However, their results also suggest that the cost of debt increases with better 
environmental risk management actions as it enables firms to take on more debt. 
Studies on the effect of CSR performance on the cost of debt distinguish between private debt 
and corporate debt financing. Goss and Roberts (2011:1794) examine the link between CSR 
and the cost of bank debt in America. As previously discussed, they argue that financiers appear 
to be indifferent to the CSR tactics of secured borrowers, however, in the absence of collateral, 
the same financiers are more sensitive to concerns regarding the social performance of 
businesses. As a result, socially irresponsible firms are more likely to pay higher loan spreads 
(between 7 and 18 basis points) and shorter debt maturities than their socially responsible 
counterparts. Overall, they claim that banks are mostly concerned about the quality of 
borrowers in terms of the security they provide, and CSR concerns are understood to be of 
secondary importance. Ye and Zhang (2011:197) use the ratio of charitable giving to sales as 
a measure of CSR to explore whether improvements in firms’ CSR performance lower the cost 
of debt financing in China. They contend that there is an optimal level of CSR investment such 
that investments below this level reduce the cost of debt financing whereas investments above 
it increase the cost of financing. Interestingly, they argue that extremely low or high levels of 
investments increase the cost of debt financing. Overall, the results concerning the relationship 
between CSR and debt financing are ambiguous. 
Given that the levels of CSR and related disclosures by firms have been found to contribute to 
reductions in information asymmetry and costs of capital, there is a reasonable amount of 
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theoretical and empirical groundwork to expect CSR to influence the capital structure decisions 
of firms and in accordance with this study, of banks. The direction of this relationship is 
suggested by Bae, Kang and Wang (2011:130) who investigate the relationship between 
investments in human resources and firm leverage using the stakeholder theory of capital 
structure. They find that firms who treat their employees fairly as evidenced by high employee 
friendly ratings have low levels of leverage, suggesting a negative relation between the two 
variables. In addition, the negative relation carries over when a different measure, namely 
inclusion in the “100 Best Companies to Work For’’ list published by Fortune magazine, is 
used and thus conclude that employment treatment is an important determinant of capital 
structure. However, the study only focuses on a single aspect (workforce) of the social 
dimension of CSR. 
 Benlemlih (2017:7) cites two studies by Girerd-Potin, Jimenez-Garcès and Louvet (2011:9) 
and Pijourlet (2013:1) that investigate a more direct association between CSR and firms’ 
financing policies. Based on a sample of 322 non-financial European firms, Girerd-Potin et al. 
(2011:14) study the effect of social ratings as a determinant of capital structure. They develop 
a model based on the fact that equity financing is more expensive for firms that are not socially 
responsible, while debt finance is indifferent between firms that are socially responsible and 
those that are not.  The author finds that firms that exhibit lower social ratings and are thus 
regarded as less socially responsible have higher or increasing levels of debt. Therefore, they 
are able to avoid penalties from the equity market through debt financing since debt is 
considered to be socially neutral and hence mitigates the need for firms to adopt investor’s 
concerns regarding CSR. They conclude that the increasing importance of CSR does have an 
impact on a firm’s financing decisions. Similarly, using a global sample of 5859 firm-year 
observations, Pijourlet (2013:2) also finds that high CSR firms have lower debt ratios and tend 
to issue larger amounts of equity than low CSR firms. Furthermore, the inverse relationship 
between leverage and social and environmental performance is only found to be significant for 
the social performance factor. The authors state that the results imply that high levels of CSR 
performance reduce information asymmetry and make it easier for firms to access equity 
markets, which in turn encourages them to issue more equity at lower costs of capital. Overall, 
they conclude that firms’ capital decisions are determined to some extent by the level of their 
CSR performance and can thus be instrumental in reducing their reliance on market conditions 
for equity issuances. According to Benlemlih (2017:7), the findings from these studies 
demonstrate that the level of CSR can influence the capital structure of firms. 
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2.4 Research Hypotheses 
The theories and empirical research studies presented thus far suggest that CSR has financing 
implications for firms. Specifically, they suggest that socially responsible firms are likely to be 
less leveraged than socially irresponsible firms as they have access to lower costs of equity 
capital from the lower perceived risk and informational asymmetries associated with better 
CSR performance and reporting. In addition, greater voluntary disclosure is associated with 
more effective capital allocation and better investment decisions (La Rosa, 2019:520).  
Although the findings from these studies have been drawn from non-financial firms, further 
evidence provided by Gropp and Heirder (2010:587) and Teixeira et al. (2014:34) suggest that 
factors that explain the capital structure of non-financial firms also explain banks’ capital 
structures, thus applying this criterion to the banking industry, socially responsible banks are 
expected to be less leveraged than banks that are less socially responsible. Since the GFC, the 
perceptions of stakeholders regarding risk and performance have turned out to be increasingly 
relevant to banks due to their reliance on depositors and the public sector as key sources of 
funding and also due to the risk aversion of investors (Jizi et al., 2014:602). It is thus presumed 
that the positive impact of good CSR performance on stakeholder relationships also generates 
a conducive environment for banks to issue equity. Therefore, the following null hypothesis 
and alternative hypothesis may be formulated regarding the capital structures of banks: 
H0: There is no relationship between the CSR and leverage of banks. 
H1: The relationship between the CSR and leverage of banks is negative. 
The Basel Committee (2013:3) also notes that the recent GFC was triggered by the failure and 
impairment of several large banks. Moreover, Chih, Chih and Chen (2010:117) suggest that 
larger financial firms are likely to be more socially responsible as they are subject to stricter 
public scrutiny. Likewise, Wu and Shen (2013:3537) argue that larger banks are more involved 
in CSR activities as they are better-resourced to do so. The importance of bank stability goes 
hand in hand with the size of banks and since the activities and decisions of larger banks have 
been observed to have wider-reaching consequences, it would be beneficial to examine if the 
size of banks influences the relationship between CSR and bank leverage. Therefore, a second 
alternative hypothesis may be formulated as follows; 
H2: Bank size influences the predicted relationship between CSR and bank leverage.  
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Section 3: Methodology 
his section outlines the research approach chosen to address the research questions posed 
in section 1 as well as the sample, variables and data used to conduct the study. The 
methodology and related analysis are also discussed.  
3.1 Research Approach 
An essential part of any research study involves the selection of an appropriate research 
approach. The choice is dependent on the research question and is usually between two widely 
used approaches; quantitative research and qualitative research, or a combination of both. 
Qualitative research is typically exploratory in nature and attempts to develop a theory from 
the results of the research based on reasonable forms of logic. In addition, the data collected is 
non-numeric and often collected through methods such as questionnaires, interviews, 
observations and focus groups (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009:52). Quantitative research, 
on the other hand, tests existing theory to data using mathematical models and statistical 
techniques in order to predict, explain or understand the relationships between pre-determined 
variables (Yilmaz, 2013:311). The development of hypotheses from existing literature means 
that the results produced either support or invalidate the research study. Since this study seeks 
to confirm the hypotheses formulated in the previous section and examine the relationship 
among selected variables, it adopts the quantitative research approach. This approach provides 
the benefit of objective results that can potentially be generalised to the rest of the banking 
industry in future and thus make a valuable contribution to existing literature on bank capital 
structure. Furthermore, the use of quantitative research in this study is consistent with the 
methods used in most research in finance, particularly those that have investigated the 
determinants of capital structure. 
3.2 Data and Sample Selection 
This study examines whether CSR is a determinant of bank capital structure as suggested by 
previous theories and empirical works. To conduct the study, the required data is obtained from 
the Thomson Reuters Datastream, Bloomberg and World Bank databases, for the period 2009 
to 2018. The selected years allow for the examination of the period immediately after the GFC, 
which is especially relevant since it corresponds with the period during which concerns about 
the social performance of the banking industry escalated. The sample adopted for the study 
consists of all the banks classified as G-SIBs due to their importance from a financial system 
stability, economic development and more recently sustainability perspective. As discussed in 
T 
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previous sections, the resilience and ability of these institutions to deal with shocks has 
significant implications for the proper functioning of the broader financial and economic 
systems. This explains why the regulatory framework includes special and additional 
provisions for these banks. Based on this rationale and in accordance with Gropp and Heider’s 
use of a sample of large systematically relevant commercial banks, the selected sample is 
considered to be more meaningful for the study than a random sample of banks. Every year in 
the month of November, the Financial Stability Board publishes an updated list of G-SIBs in 
consultation with national authorities and the BCBS (Financial Stability Board, 2018:1). As at 
November 2018, 29 banking institutions were identified as G-SIBs. However, due to absence 
of CSR data for one of the banks (Groupe BPCE), only 28 of these banks make up the sample 
for the study. Although the sample size of 28 might be considered to be small, the combined 
assets of the G-SIBs account for a majority of the global banking activity. In addition, the 
selected sample is deemed appropriate for the purposes of this study as it is largely interested 
on the CSR activities of banks that have a significant impact on society. 
The designation of a bank as a G-SIB depends on the indicator-based measurement approach 
developed by the BCBS (BCBS, 2013:5). This approach is based on a framework of 5 
quantitative indicators that reflect the various aspects of the contributions to systemic risk and 
the adverse implications that result from bank impairments or failures. These indicators are 
briefly discussed below as described by the BCBS (BCBS, 2013:7); 
• Size of the bank 
Large banks typically engage in more global activities, hence any disruptions in their operation 
are likely to have greater systemic impacts. This is because the larger the bank, the more 
difficult it will be for other banks to swiftly replace its service offering which raises the 
probability that its distress or failure will interrupt the proper functioning of wider financial 
system. As witnessed during and after the GFC, another possible consequence of the distress 
of a large bank is the loss of public trust in the stability of financial system as a whole, 
increasing the likelihood of a run on deposits and placing the entire financial system in distress.  
• Interconnectedness of the bank with other financial institutions 
The failure of single bank can be a source of systemic risk due to its connection with other 
banks and financial institutions. This is mainly through the contractual obligations related to 
intra-financial system assets and liabilities as well as the provision of payment and settlement 
services to other institutions in the financial markets. The degree of interdependence among 
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banking and other financial firms thus determines the financial system’s ability to withstand 
any shocks and subsequent disruptions. 
• Complexity of the bank and its operations 
The systemic risk posed by the distress or failure of banks is also influenced by the complexity 
of their business models, structures and activities. Banks often perform/take on multiple 
activities simultaneously (e.g. commercial banking, insurance and investment/asset 
management) and engage in complex derivative and trading activities that make them 
vulnerable to exposures from movements in the market. Since they also operate in several 
countries via branches and subsidiaries, they may be subject to different regulatory and legal 
frameworks, adding to the complexity of their organisational structures and business models. 
The more complex the bank’s structures and operations, the greater the resources required to 
rescue them from distress and the greater the chances that the distress will spread to the rest of 
the financial system. 
• Substitutability of the financial services and products provided by the bank 
Substitutability refers to the extent to which the financial infrastructure, services and products 
provided by a bank in distress can be taken on or replicated by other banks. The goal is to 
lessen disruption to the financial market from the withdrawal of a key market participant as 
well as the tapered flow of market liquidity caused by banks that play a greater role in providing 
essential services related to payments activity and underwriting transactions in capital markets. 
The less substitutable a bank’s functions are, the more systemically important it is, especially 
if these functions are deemed to be critical to the stability of the wider financial system and the 
functioning of the global economy. 
 
• Global/ cross-jurisdictional activity 
The globalisation of the banking system also means that the impact of a bank’s failure can be 
easily transmitted to the rest of the international financial system. This is particularly true for 
banks that have a greater global footprint and thus a greater share of cross-jurisdictional assets 
and liabilities as the spill over effects from their failures are likely to be more material and 
widespread. In addition, a higher level of engagement in global activities reduces the chances 
of a timely resolution of a distressed bank as well as the capacity to limit the adverse effects of 
bank failures. Among the 29 G-SIBs, 7 are located in Asia, 13 in Europe and 9 in North-
America. The geographical dispersion of these institutions emphasises the wider potential 
consequences that could arise from the failure of any one of these banks due to the interlinkages 
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that exist between internationally active banks. A list of these banks together with a breakdown 
by country and region is presented on Table 2.  
Altogether, these indicators are key measures of systemic importance and therefore, make G-
SIBs a particularly interesting universe. The BCBS (2013:5) acknowledges that it may be 
difficult to quantify the systemic impacts of these indicators before the fact and so it allows for 
supervisory judgement based on qualitative information. However, such judgement is only 
permissible in exceptional cases and is subject to international peer review. 
Table 2: List of G-SIBs as at November 2018 
Bank Name Country of Origin Region 




Bank of China 
Asia-Pacific (7)  
China Construction Bank 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China  
Mitsubishi UFJ FG 
Japan Mizuho FG 






Standard Chartered  
BNP Paribas  
France 
Groupe BPCE 
Groupe Crédit Agricole 
Société Générale 
Deutsche Bank Germany 
UniCredit Group Italy 





Bank of America 
USA 
North America (9) 
Bank of New York Mellon 
Citigroup 
Goldman Sachs 




Royal Bank of Canada Canada 
Source: Compiled using the published list of G-SIBs as at November 16, 2018 
The following sub-section outlines the variables and statistical model applied in analysing the 
data collected. 
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3.3 Measurement of Variables and Research Model 
Variables 
The variables used in this study are limited to those used in recent empirical studies on bank 
capital structure. In line with common practise in capital structure research, leverage is used as 
the dependent variable to define capital structure. The use of leverage as the dependent variable 
is appropriate as it includes non-debt liabilities such as bank deposits. According to Gropp and 
Heider (2010:598), leverage can either be measured in terms of book value or market value 
and although both measures have been used interchangeably in previous capital structure 
studies and yielded similar results, the distinction between market and book bank leverage is 
especially important for banks since regulation is imposed on book bank capital. Nonetheless, 
the authors find that the difference between market and book bank leverage is insignificant 
(Gropp & Heider, 2010:600). This is also consistent with Teixeira et al. (2014:44)’s assertions 
about the negligible difference between market and book bank leverage. In this study, leverage 
is measured in market values as it has the advantage of being forward-looking (Frank & Goyal, 
2009:2). 
The key independent variable in this study is CSR. Various proxy measures for CSR have been 
used in prior empirical research studies as noted in the previous discussion on CSR, however, 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure scores or ratings are generally used as 
proxies for CSR (Esteban-Sanchez et al., 2017:1103). Following Esteban-Sanchez et al. 
(2017:1103) who use the equal-weighted Datastream ASSET4 ratings, this study adopts the 
Refinitiv Datastream ESG scores which replaced the ASSET4 ratings that were phased out in 
2018 (Refinitiv, 2019:3). Refinitiv Datastream ESG scores rank firms based on public data 
reported by companies on their performance across the three ESG dimensions and according 
to ten main categories that correspond with each of these dimensions. The ten categories and 
their descriptions are presented on Appendix 1. Company data used to generate the scores is 
sourced from firms’ annual reports, stock exchange filings, CSR reports and news media 
(Refinitiv, 2019:3). 
There are two overall ESG scores; the ESG Score measures firms’ CSR performance based on 
public company-reported disclosures while the ESG Combined Score (ESGC) links the basic 
ESG Score with any material ESG controversies reported in the media. In the absence of ESG 
controversies, both scores are equal. Scores are reported both in percentages from 0 to 100 and 
letter grades that range from A+ to D-. The higher the ESG score in percentage terms or letter 
27 | P a g e  
 
grade, the more socially responsible a firm is assumed to be. In this study, the social 
responsibility quality of a bank is measured by the ESG Score since it measures the overall 
degree of banks’ transparency through voluntary disclosures and is also consistent measure to 
use across all banks. The former ASSET4 ratings have been used in several other empirical 
studies such as Ioannou and Serafeim (2012:844), Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014:6), 
Stellner, Klein and Zwergel (2015:542) and La Rosa et al. (2018:523) as a measure for CSR.  
Following existing work on bank capital structure determinants and in particular Gropp and 
Heider (2010:596), additional independent variables include bank size, profitability, 
tangibility, growth, dividends, asset risk and tax.  These variables represent a set of factors that 
have been observed to explain the capital structure of banks and are thus used to control for the 
various effects that might confound the relationship between CSR and bank leverage. Their 
effect on leverage has already been explained under section 2.1.2. Furthermore, Teixeira et al. 
(2014:38) note that is it important to control for macroeconomic variables as banks are 
presumed to be highly exposed to the economic activities in their respective countries 
considering the roles they play in economic and financial systems. Consequently, the study 
includes gross domestic product (GDP) growth and inflation data obtained from the World 
Bank database as further explanatory variables. Table 3 provides a summary of all the variables 
used in the study, including their measures, sources of data and their expected relationship with 
bank leverage according to the predictions of literature on bank capital structure. 
Table 3: Summary of Variables Used in the study 




Leverage (LEV) 1 minus (market value of equity/market 






Key Independent Variable 
CSR (CSR) ESG Score 
Datastream - 
ESG Dimensions: 
Environmental (ENV) Environment Dimension Score 
Social (SOC) Social Dimension Score 
Corporate Governance (GOV) Governance Dimension Score 
Control Variables 
Bank-specific factors:    






Profitability (PROF) Return on assets (pre-tax profits + 
interest expenses over the book value of 
assets) 
- 
Asset tangibility (TANG) Ratio of tangible assets to total assets + 
Growth (GROWTH) Ratio of market-to-book value of assets - 
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Asset risk (ARISK) Annualized standard deviation of daily 
stock returns * (market value of 






Taxation (TAX) Effective tax rate  + 
Dividend Payment (DIV)- 
Dummy variable 
Assumes a value of 1 if the bank paid  
dividends in a given year, and 0 
otherwise 
 - 
Macroeconomic variables:    
GDP Growth (GDP) Annual % change in GDP  
World Bank 
+ 
Inflation (INF) Annual % change in average CPI 
Source: Author’s own 
Econometric Model 
To examine the link between CSR and bank capital structure, this study employs a multiple 
regression analysis of panel data based on 280 bank-year observations. The use of panel data 
allows for the control of variables that cannot be measured or observed in strictly cross-section 
or time series data and helps to account for the heterogeneity that typically exists in panel data 
(de Jager, 2008:56). There are two estimation techniques that can be used to model panel data; 
the Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) models. The FE model assumes that unobserved 
variables and observed variables are associated, whereas the RE model assumes that 
unobserved variables are not correlated with the observable variables. The Durbin-Wu 
Hausman specification test (Hausman test) will be used to determine which of the two models 
is more appropriate to apply to the data. In addition, as in Gropp and Heider (2010:596) and 
Teixeira et al. (2014:36), a lag of one year between bank leverage and all the explanatory 
variables, except the dividend dummy and macroeconomic variables, is applied to address any 
endogeneity issues. This means that bank leverage data was collected from 2010 to 2018, while 
data for the independent variables was gathered from 2009 to 2017. 
Following Sorokina (2017:36) and based on previous standard capital structure research, a new 
financial management model is proposed that includes CSR as an explanatory variable of bank 
capital structure in addition to the traditional explanatory variables. Two separate regression 
models are used to test the hypotheses formulated in this study. The first model tests the null 
(H0) and first alternative hypotheses (H1), while the second model tests the second alternative 
hypothesis (H2). To test H2, the first model is modified to interact the CSR and size variables 
to capture the effect of bank size on the relationship predicted under H1. A significant result 
for the interacting variables will support this hypothesis. Furthermore, the link between CSR 
and bank leverage is further analysed by disaggregating the CSR variable in both models 
(represented by the ESG score) into its component parts.  
The models are thus defined as:  
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LEVict = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1CSRict-1 + 𝛽2ln(SIZE)𝑖c𝑡-1 + 𝛽3PROF𝑖c𝑡-1 + 𝛽4TANG𝑖c𝑡-1 + 𝛽5GROWTHict-1 + 
𝛽6ARISKict-1 + 𝛽7DIV𝑖c𝑡 + 𝛽8TAXic𝑡-1 + 𝛽9GDPic𝑡 + 𝛽10INFic𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖ct                          (Model 1)                                                                                                                                
 
LEVict = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1CSRict-1 + 𝛽2ln(SIZE)𝑖c𝑡-1  + 𝛽3PROF𝑖c𝑡-1 + 𝛽4TANG𝑖c𝑡-1 + 𝛽5GROWTHict-1 + 
𝛽6ARISKict-1 + 𝛽7DIV𝑖c𝑡 + 𝛽8TAXic𝑡-1 + 𝛽9GDPic𝑡 + 𝛽10INFic𝑡  + 𝛽11CSR*SIZEict + 𝜇𝑖ct                                       
                                                                                                                                      (Model 2) 
Where 𝛽0 is the constant term, 𝛽n is the coefficient of independent variables and the subscripts 
i, c, and t denote the ith bank in the cth country at time t, respectively. Xict−1 represents a set of 
one-year lagged bank-specific factors and 𝜇𝑖c𝑡 is the error term. The equations of the models 
will be estimated using Stata 15 Statistical Analysis Software. The results and related 
discussions are presented in the next section.  
Section 4: Results and Analysis 
his section presents the results of the econometric models described in the methodology 
section. An analysis of the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables used 
in the study is undertaken before the results are discussed.  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
A summary of the descriptive statistics for bank leverage, CSR and the control variables are 
provided in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
LEV 279 0.9474 0.0328 0.8597 0.9544 0.9951 
CSR 277 0.7681 0.1237 0.3000 0.7900 0.9500 
SIZE 280 14.8556 1.8124 11.9700 14.2471 19.5422 
PROF 280 0.0179 0.0107 -0.0076 0.0159 0.0744 
TANG 280 0.9875 0.0147 0.8971 0.9929 0.9999 
GROWTH 279 0.9835 0.0210 0.9170 0.9789 1.0517 
ARISK 278 0.0155 0.0137 0.0029 0.0118 0.1393 
DIV 280 0.8786 0.3272 0 1 1 
TAX 249 0.3447 0.7373 0.0009 0.2549 11.3458 
GDP 280 0.0332 0.1129 -0.0562 0.0184 0.9400 
INF 280 0.0137 0.0123 -0.0135 0.0151 0.0555 
Note: LEV=Leverage; CSR=Corporate Social Responsibility; SIZE= Bank Size; PROF=Profitability; TANG= 
Asset Tangibility; GROWTH=Bank Growth; ARISK= Asset Risk; DIV= Dividend Dummy; TAX= Taxation; 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product; INF= Inflation. 
T 
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A review of the descriptive statistics shows that the average leverage of the banks in the sample 
is 94.74%, with a minimum leverage of 85.97 % and a maximum leverage of 99.51% indicating 
that in one year, one of the banks was almost entirely financed by debt.  The corresponding 
standard deviation of 0.0328 suggests that most leverage values are relatively close to the 
average. This is consistent with the expectation and common observation of a highly leveraged 
banking industry as presented on Appendix 2 which shows the average leverage ratios of the 
G-SIBs over the sample period. In terms of size, the average bank size during the period under 
review was 14.86. The standard deviation of 1.8 for this control variable suggests that the 
sample exhibits some variation in the size of the banks despite the selection of G-SIBs that are 
generally assumed to be too big to fail.  However, it is important to note that the designation 
of a bank as a G-SIB is not solely based on its size but also on the other four factors discussed 
in the methodology section. This may explain the dispersion in the size of the banks. Bank size 
is considered to be important in the study since it is expected to influence the predicted 
relationship between CSR and bank leverage.  
Regarding profitability, the sampled banks exhibited an average return on assets of 1.79% 
during the years 2009 to 2018, with a minimum and maximum return on assets of -0.76% and 
7.44%, respectively. The average asset risk was 1.55%, with a standard deviation of 0.0137 
and a minimum and maximum assets risk of 1.18% and 13.93%, respectively. The statistics on 
profitability and asset risk suggest that the G-SIBs experienced low and relatively stable returns 
during the sample period. The asset structure of the banks in the sample was represented by an 
average of 98.7% implying that a majority of bank book assets are made up of tangible assets. 
The standard deviation of 0.015 further implies that this is true for most of the banks. 
Furthermore, the average market-to-book ratio, which measures the growth potential of the 
banks, was 0.9835, with a minimum of 0.917 and a maximum of 1.052. This indicates that in 
general these banks’ market values are close to the book value of their assets and hence the 
lower growth that is expected by the markets.  
Further review of the descriptive statistics indicates that there was data missing for some of the 
independent variables used in the study. With regards to the leverage, CSR, growth and asset 
risk variables the missing data pertains to the listing of Agricultural Bank of China in August 
2010, hence no market data was available before then to compute the relevant measures. Much 
of the missing data was in relation to the tax variable due to data unavailability. It is important 
to note that missing data has the potential to reduce the statistical power of a study and can 
produce biased regression estimates that affect the validity of the conclusions reached. 
31 | P a g e  
 
However, since the data used in the study is missing completely at random, the estimated 
parameters were not biased by the absence of the data.  
As the main variable of interest in this study, the average ESG score of the G-SIBs in the 
sample (which is a proxy for CSR) was 76.81%, with a minimum and maximum of 30% and 
95%, respectively. The standard deviation of 0.1237 indicates that the reported scores of the 
banks are not too far off from each other. Given the objective of this study and reliance on ESG 
scores to predict the relationship between banks’ level of CSR commitment and leverage, it is 
useful to further analyse the ESG scores by comparing the summary statistics of the individual 
scores of the three dimensions that make up the combined ESG scores. These statistics are 
summarised in Table 5 below.  
Table 5: Summary Statistics of ESG Scores 
ESG Dimension N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Environmental 277 0.8553 0.1137 0.4000 0.8900 0.9900 
Social 277 0.7605 0.1691 0.1600 0.7900 0.9800 
Governance 277 0.6797 0.1747 0.1700 0.7300 0.9600 
 
The average scores of the individual ESG dimensions appear to be fairly close to each other, 
with the governance dimension exhibiting a lower average score than the other two dimensions. 
In addition, it appears that the G-SIBs score higher on the environmental dimension. This 
suggests that, in general, G-SIBs score best in the environmental dimension and worst in the 
governance dimension. It is also evident that both the social and governance scores exhibit the 
lowest reported scores compared to the environmental dimension. Overall, based on the 
standard deviations, all three dimensions have moderately low variation in their scores.  
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation matrix provided on Table 6 shows the correlations between bank leverage 
(dependent variable) and the pre-specified explanatory variables. A review of the correlations 
allows for an analysis of the strength and direction of the relationship between these variables 
as well as the identification of any multicollinearity issues among the independent variables.  
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix (Pearson) 
**, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Note: ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
The main correlation between bank leverage and CSR is negative, providing preliminary 
support for the direction of the relationship between the two variables as predicted in the first 
hypothesis. The correlation coefficient of -0.043 is, however, statistically insignificant, 
implying that there is no correlation between CSR and the leverage of the G-SIBs. A graphical 
representation of this correlation is presented on Appendix 3. It can be observed that the line 
of best fit on the scatter graph is only slightly negative. A significant negative correlation 
between CSR and size can also be observed, which implies that the larger the bank the lower 
its ESG disclosure score. This may have implications for the interaction term between the two 
variables under the second hypothesis. Overall, the signs of the coefficients and the correlations 
between bank leverage and the control variables are consistent with those findings typically 
observed in standard capital structure literature.   
Based on the correlation matrix above, there appears to be no multicollinearity issues. 
Multicollinearity refers to a situation in which the independent variables in a multiple 
regression model are highly correlated with one or more other independent variables, 
weakening the statistical significance of those variables due to large standard errors.  Most of 
the independent variables in the matrix only exhibit weak correlations with each other. The 
highest correlations are between size and tangibility and between size and CSR with values of 
0.489 and 0.475, respectively. However, these correlations are not high enough to give rise to 
any multicollinearity problems or warrant corrective measures. To provide further evidence of 
the absence of multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) are used to test for 
multicollinearity. VIF measures the level of collinearity between explanatory variables in a 
Variables LEV CSR SIZE PROF TANG GRWTH ARISK DIV TAX GDP INF 
LEV 1                     
CSR -0.043 1          
SIZE 0.339*** -0.475*** 1         
PROF -0.217*** -0.230*** -0.144 1        
TANG 0.529*** -0.258*** 0.489*** 0.164*** 1       
GROWTH -0.700*** 0.077 -0.255*** 0.236*** -0.180** 1      
ARISK -0.587*** 0.087 -0.324*** 0.157 -0.451*** 0.346*** 1     
DIV -0.375*** -0.193** 0.151** 0.172 -0.124** 0.201*** 0.228*** 1    
TAX 0.106* -0.082 0.114* -0.151** 0.057 -0.051 -0.050 0.001 1   
GDP -0.192*** -0.437*** 0.223*** 0.306*** 0.221*** 0.149*** -0.181*** 0.152** -0.223*** 1  
INF -0.114** -0.172*** -0.131 0.279*** -0.019 -0.023 -0.118** 0.117* -0.178*** 0.373*** 1 
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regression model. As a rule of thumb, a VIF of 5 or less indicates that there is no 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables used in the regression model. The results 
of the multicollinearity test presented on Appendix 4 confirm that the models used in the study 
do not suffer from multicollinearity. 
The next subsection discusses the results of the regression models.  
4.3 Regression Results 
Tables 7 and 8 below show the results of the regressions on the determinants of bank capital 
structure for the specified regression models. These models were estimated using the Pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and FE regression techniques. For the Pooled OLS models, the 
Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (Ramsey-RESET) for omitted variable 
bias indicated that there were unobserved individual effects as the null hypothesis of no omitted 
variables was rejected as deduced from the test statistic of 13.48 which was significant at the 
1% level (refer to Appendix 5).  
In order to improve the robustness of the Pooled OLS regression results, it was necessary to 
estimate other variations of panel data techniques, namely the FE and RE techniques, that 
would provide a better fit for the data. Regression diagnostics under both techniques suggest 
that the estimated results are statistically significant in explaining the determinants of bank 
capital structure. Specifically, the F-test statistics (under the FE model) and Wald test statistics 
(under the RE model) were significant at the 1% level across all the models (refer to Appendix 
5). These techniques are thus considered to be more appropriate than the Pooled OLS 
technique. The Hausman test was employed to determine which model to use between FE and 
RE, as shown on Appendix 6. A large and significant Hausman test statistic value means that 
there is a large difference between the RE and FE estimators and so the null hypothesis is 
rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis. The Hausman test statistic value of 96.44 was 
significant at the 1% level, hence the null hypothesis was rejected, favouring the use of the FE 
technique. Furthermore, like Gropp and Heider (2010:596), robust standard errors clustered at 
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4.3.1 Results from Regression Model 1 
Table 7: Fixed Effects (FE) Regression results for Model 1 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
(LEVERAGE) 
Model 1 Model 1(a) 
Constant 2.201*** 2.170*** 
 (0.265) (0.273) 
CSR -0.0299 - 
 (0.0230)  
ENV - -0.00260 
  (0.0198) 
SOC - 0.0126 
  (0.0151) 
GOV - -0.0229** 
  (0.00982) 
SIZE -0.000517 -0.00385 
 (0.00903) (0.00993) 
PROF 0.317 0.394 
 (0.256) (0.239) 
TANG -0.926*** -0.873*** 
 (0.286) (0.281) 
GROWTH -0.318*** -0.304*** 
 (0.109) (0.103) 
ARISK -0.184** -0.197** 
 (0.0832) (0.0741) 
DIV -0.00769*** -0.00873*** 
 (0.00216) (0.00215) 
TAX 0.00105** 0.0241 
 (0.000419) (0.0471) 
GDP 0.0265 0.00100** 
 (0.0486) (0.000404) 
INF 0.382*** 0.363*** 
 (0.109) (0.107) 
R-squared 0.329 0.343 
F [prob.] 24.17 [0.0000] 26.43 [0.0000] 
Number of banks 28 28 
Number of observations 220 220 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (); ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Note: ENV= Environment Dimension Score, SOC= Social Dimension Score and GOV = Governance Dimension 
Score. For Model 1(a), LEV ict = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ENVict-1 + 𝛽2SOCict-1 + 𝛽3GOVict-1 + 𝛽4ln(SIZE)𝑖c𝑡-1 + 𝛽5PROF𝑖c𝑡-1 + 
𝛽6TANG𝑖c𝑡-1 + 𝛽7GROWTHict-1 + 𝛽8ARISKict-1 + 𝛽9DIV𝑖c𝑡 + 𝛽10TAXic𝑡-1 + 𝛽11GDPic𝑡 + 𝛽12INFic𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖ct  
35 | P a g e  
 
The results from Model 1 show that CSR has a negative but insignificant impact on the leverage 
of the banks in the sample. While the negative sign of the coefficient supports the expected 
direction of the relationship between CSR and bank leverage, the null hypothesis that there is 
no relationship between CSR and bank leverage cannot be rejected due to the lack of statistical 
significance. Moreover, the low estimated coefficient of -0.03 suggests that CSR performance 
accounts for very little, if any, of the variation in bank leverage. A possible explanation for the 
weak significance of the CSR coefficient could arise from the measurement of CSR using the 
aggregate score. It could be that the banks perhaps respond to specific social concerns. 
Therefore, in order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between CSR and 
leverage, the ESG Scores used as the CSR proxy in Model 1 were substituted by the scores of 
the individual ESG dimensions, that is, the ENV, SOC and GOV scores. This allowed for an 
analysis of the ESG dimensions that banks are likely to account for in their capital structure 
decisions. The results of the disaggregated ESG Scores are presented in Table 7 under Model 
1(a). The results show that, although the coefficients of the environmental and social 
dimensions remain insignificant, the sign of the coefficient between the governance dimension 
and bank leverage is negative and statistically significant at 5%. Moreover, only the governance 
and environmental dimensions produce the predicted negative sign of the coefficient.  
Further review of the coefficients of the control variables used in Model 1 shows that most of 
the explanatory variables considered show statistical significance which is consistent with the 
recent literature on bank capital structure. Tangibility, growth, dividend dummy and inflation 
are significant at 1%, while asset risk and tax are significant at the 5% level. These variables 
retain their statistical significance under Model 1(a), except for tax, and GDP becomes 
significant at the 5% level. In addition, all the coefficients have the expected sign, except for 
size, profitability and tangibility. However, the coefficients of the size and profitability 
variables are insignificant, hence no reasonable conclusion can be drawn regarding their 
relation to leverage. The negative coefficient of the tangibility variable is consistent with the 
pecking order theory. Overall, the explanatory variables included in the regression models 
collectively account for roughly a third of the change in bank leverage, based on the R-squares 
of 32.9% (Model 1) and 34.3% (Model 1(a)). This suggests that regulation is not the sole 
determinant of bank capital structure. This is further supported by the F-tests on the joint 
significance of all the explanatory variables on bank leverage which generate statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
36 | P a g e  
 
4.3.2 Results from Regression Model 2 
The results from Model 2 regarding the second hypothesis are shown in Table 8 below.  





Model 2 Model 2(a) 
Constant 2.253*** 2.196*** 
 (0.277) (0.298) 
CSR -0.0244 - 
 (0.0191)  
ENV - -0.00917 
  (0.0266) 
SOC - 0.0208 
  (0.0162) 
GOV - -0.0194** 
  (0.00791) 
SIZE -0.00114 -0.00402 
 (0.0109) (0.0116) 
PROF 0.323 0.384 
 (0.244) (0.231) 
TANG -0.947*** -0.877*** 
 (0.291) (0.298) 
GROWTH -0.337*** -0.322** 
 (0.119) (0.116) 
ARISK -0.179** -0.205** 
 (0.0849) (0.0831) 
DIV -0.00786*** -0.00987*** 
 (0.00242) (0.00306) 
TAX 0.00101** 0.0429 
 (0.000419) (0.0656) 
GDP 0.0248 0.00105** 
 (0.0505) (0.000499) 
INF 0.354*** 0.349*** 
 (0.104) (0.115) 
CSR*SIZE -0.000582 - 
 (0.00117)  
ENV*SIZE  0.000707 
  (0.00152) 
SOC*SIZE  -0.000541 
  (0.000835) 
GOV*SIZE  -0.000722 
  (0.00109) 
R-squared  0.343 0.362 
F [prob.] 20.65 [0.0000] 54.19 [0.0000] 
Number of banks 28 28 
Number of observations 220 220 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (); ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
For Model 2(a), LEVict = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ENVict-1 + 𝛽2SOCict-1 + 𝛽3GOVict-1 + 𝛽4ln(SIZE)𝑖c𝑡-1 + 𝛽5PROF𝑖c𝑡-1 + 𝛽6TANG𝑖c𝑡-1 
+ 𝛽7GROWTHict-1 + 𝛽8ARISKict-1 + 𝛽9DIV𝑖c𝑡 + 𝛽10TAXic𝑡-1 + 𝛽11GDPic𝑡 + 𝛽12INFic𝑡 + 𝛽13ENV*SIZEict + 
𝛽14SOC*SIZEict + 𝛽15GOV*SIZEict + 𝜇𝑖ct 
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Model 2 includes an interaction term between CSR and bank size to identify any interaction 
effects between the two variables. The results show that there is an insignificant interaction 
between CSR and size when CSR is measured in aggregate terms. As in Model 1, each of the 
three ESG dimensions is interacted with the size variable to produce the results in Model 2(a), 
however, insignificant interactions are still found between each of the ESG dimensions and 
size. This implies that the size of a bank has no effect on the link between CSR and leverage 
and thus invalidates the second hypothesis. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the interaction terms 
between the ESG dimensions and size does not change the direction and significance of the 
relationships observed in Models 1 and 1(a) as most of them remain stable. Most importantly, 
the negative and significant relationship between the governance dimension and bank leverage 
also remains intact. The next subsection discusses the implications of the observed results. 
4.4 Discussion of Results 
The first hypothesis predicted an inverse relation between CSR and leverage. The regression 
results on Table 7 are inconsistent with Pijourlet (2013:17) who finds a significant negative 
relationship between the two variables using the aggregate CSR score. Similarly, Girerd-Potin 
(2011:34) initially find an insignificant negative relation, but after accounting for the 
distribution in the aggregate social rating their results become significant. 
Further analysis of the individual CSR dimensions does reveal, however, that there is a 
significant negative relationship between the governance dimension of the ESG score and bank 
leverage. This is not surprising given that under the Refinitiv ESG scoring methodology, the 
specific CSR strategies of companies are reflected in the governance dimension score (see 
Appendix 1). According to the methodology, the governance dimension reflects a company’s 
actions to communicate that it integrates social responsibility into its daily operations and 
decision-making processes (Refinitiv, 2019:16). Interestingly, Laeven (2013:65) also notes that 
the recent GFC has been linked to failures and weaknesses in the governance systems of banks, 
particularly with regards to their risk management processes. The results obtained thus make 
intuitive sense and imply that the governance dimension could be more relevant for banks than 
the other two dimensions. A similar assertion is made by Pijourlet (2013:17) who, after failing 
to obtain a significant result between the environment dimension and leverage, states that 
investors may be less concerned about environmental policies than assumed. Overall, the results 
suggest that banks with sound governance systems will be less leveraged than banks with poor 
governance practices in place.  
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The link established between the governance structures of banks and capital structure could be 
instrumental in restoring public confidence in the banking system. As previously pointed out 
by Wu and Shen (2013:3531), CSR can be linked to banks through their reputations. Good 
governance systems encourage corporate accountability and greater transparency which in turn 
have a beneficial influence on the reputation of banks and their relations with stakeholders.  
Moreover, greater transparency reduces informational asymmetries between a firm’s insiders 
and its external stakeholders which allows for better communication and thus helps banks to 
remain reputable (Cui, Jo & Na, 2018:549). According to Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch 
(2016:731) effective governance systems are also useful in predicting bank failures. Therefore, 
the observed relationship could help to reduce the risk of another financial crisis through sound 
risk management processes that control for excessive risk taking by banks, especially those that 
are deemed to be systemically important. Since overleverage in the banking sector is viewed 
as a key risk to financial and economic stability, such governance systems could be a safeguard 
for the economy and society. 
However, it should be noted that the estimated coefficient values of the governance variable 
suggest that it has less explanatory power than most of control variables included in the 
regression models. A possible reason is provided by Girerd-Potin et al. (2011:36) who argue 
that the application of the CSR concept to the capital markets is a relatively recent phenomenon 
and since current leverage levels are the result of past capital structure decisions and evolve 
rather slowly, it will take time for CSR strategies to be fully reflected in capital structures. It 
could thus be deduced that as banks continue to address societal concerns about the 
overleveraged banking industry by adjusting their capital structures, governance and perhaps 
even aggregate CSR will have greater explanatory power for future leverage levels. 
This study was unable to find significant relationships between the environment and social 
dimension with bank leverage. The lack of an environment-leverage relation is in accordance 
with Pijourlet (2013:17), as mentioned above, and Girerd-Potin (2011:43) who note that 
although the results are surprising, it could be that investors are sacrificing environmentally 
conscious firms for firms that are more socially inclined.  However, Sharfman and Wood 
(2008:570) find a negative environment-leverage relationship and claim that adequate 
environmental risk management lowers the cost of equity which makes equity financing more 
appealing. In terms of the social dimension, Bae et al. (2011:130) find that firms that are 
committed to fair employee treatment are less leveraged. Although they only focus on the 
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workforce aspect of the social dimension, their findings illustrate that the social dimension can 
be inversely related to leverage. 
The second hypothesis sought to examine the influence of bank size on the predicted link 
between CSR and bank leverage. The insignificance of the interaction terms between the ESG 
scores and the individual ESG dimension scores with the size variable imply that banks that 
are more socially responsible are likely to be less leveraged irrespective of their size. However, 
Chih et al. (2010:124) argue that larger financial firms are expected to be more socially 
responsible since they are highly visible and so are naturally subject to greater public scrutiny. 
In addition, larger banks are thought to be better-resourced to engage in more CSR activities 
than their smaller counterparts and are therefore, expected to exercise better social 
responsibility. The finding from this study could be distorted by the fact that the G-SIBs used 
in the sample represent some of largest banks globally, so any interaction with the size variable 
is unlikely to produce the expected effect. Bank size is highly relevant to the stability of the 
banking system since the failure or distress of larger banks is likely to be more material than 
the failure of smaller banks, hence larger banks have more reason to be mindful of societal 
concerns regarding their capital structures and take these concerns into consideration in their 
capital decisions.  
Overall, these results emphasise the increasingly important role of CSR in the banking industry 
and its relevance to the capital structures of banks. 
Section 5: Conclusion 
uided by the increasing importance of CSR in the banking industry and the  recent 
empirical findings on the applicability of the standard capital structure determinants to 
banks, this study set out to examine the capital structures of a sample of 28 G-SIBs, with a 
focus on CSR as a possible determinant of their capital structure. Based on the favourable 
influence of CSR on equity financing, the study hypothesised that the leverage of banks is 
inversely related to their CSR performance and that the size of banks influences this 
relationship. The results show that there is no relation between the aggregate measure of CSR 
and bank leverage which is inconsistent with the findings from previous empirical studies on 
the link between CSR and capital structure. However, when the CSR measure is unpacked 
further, a significant negative relation was only found between the governance dimension of 
CSR and bank leverage, suggesting that the governance dimension could be more important 
G 
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for bank capital structures than the environmental and social dimensions. Overall, the finding 
suggests that, to some extent, CSR is indeed a determinant of the capital structure of G-SIBs 
and thus provides insight into how they are adapting to societal standards after the GFC. In 
spite of the greater public scrutiny of these banks, bank size was found to have no effect on the 
predicted relationship.  
5.1 Contributions and Policy Implications 
In recognising that knowledge about the CSR performance of banks as well the perception of 
their social responsibility is of interest to investors, customers and regulators, this study makes 
several contributions to the existing literature on CSR and bank capital structure. Firstly, by 
extending the works of Pijourlet (2013:1) and Girerd-Potin (2011:9), whose work focus on the 
impact of CSR on the financing decisions of non-financial firms, to banks, it highlights the 
growing importance of CSR in the banking industry and its potential role in restoring public 
trust in the banking system following the GFC. This is particularly important in this era where 
society is critical of how these large international banks conduct their activities. Secondly, the 
results provide further support for Gropp and Heider (2010:587) and Teixeira et al. (2014:34) 
who propose that the drivers of the capital structures of non-financial firms also determine that 
of banks and thus negate capital regulation as the sole determinant of their capital structures.   
Lastly, the results of this study have important implications for the regulation of banks and 
especially, G-SIBs. Since the GFC, the BCBS has embarked on several reforms in an effort to 
enhance the resilience of the banking industry (BCBS, 2013:2), including higher capital 
requirements and the introduction of leverage ratios. The results of this study could be 
incorporated into these reforms, provided they are based on negotiation and mutual agreement 
between banks, regulators and other relevant stakeholders. This is because banks are likely to 
be more socially responsible if there are fair regulations in place to encourage such behaviour. 
This should help to improve bank stability and that of the wider financial system as well as 
prevent future financial crises. However, it is important to note that such policies rest on the 
recognition that commitment to CSR is the in the long-term interest of both the banking system 
and society at large.  
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5.2 Limitations of the Study and Areas for Further Research 
This study relied on the use of ESG scores to measure the CSR performance of the G-SIBs. 
While Cho et al. (2013:74) acknowledge that third party CSR ratings are often used as an 
informative source when making investment decisions, it is important to note, however, that 
these ratings are disclosure oriented and do not necessarily reflect how firms actually perform 
in terms of CSR.  Some banks may be inconsistent in their disclosure processes thus their CSR 
activities may not be captured in the ESG scores, reducing the reliability of the score as a 
measure of CSR. Furthermore, as argued by Aras et al. (2018:600), the concept of CSR is far 
too extensive in reality to be reduced to the three basic ESG dimensions. Certain aspects of 
CSR may be difficult to quantify therefore, it may not be possible to effectively measure the 
entirety of banks’ CSR activities.  
Nevertheless, the findings from this study suggest that there is scope for further research in the 
area of CSR and bank capital structure. Firstly, given that G-SIBs represent a unique universe 
of banks, the inclusion of other banks and financial institutions in the sample should help to 
clarify the applicability of the current research findings to the rest of the banking and financial 
services industry since they are also integral components of the wider financial system. The 
period beyond the GFC could also be extended to determine the extent of the explanatory power 
of CSR on bank capital structure. Secondly, it should be noted that the individual ESG 
dimensions are made of numerous aspects and each of these aspects could have a different 
impact on bank capital structure. Incorporating these different aspects into the analysis would 
provide more insight into the particular CSR issues that banks account for in their capital 
structure decisions.  
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Refinitiv ESG dimensions, categories and category definitions 
ESG Dimension Category Category Definitions 
Environmental 
Resource use 
Performance and capacity to reduce the use 
of materials, energy or water. 
Emissions 
Commitment to and effectiveness in 
reducing environmental emissions. 
Innovation 
Reflects a company’s capacity to reduce the 
environmental costs and burdens for its 
customers, thereby creating new market 
opportunities through new environmental 




Effectiveness towards job satisfaction, 
healthy and safe workplace, maintaining 
diversity and equal opportunities, and 
development opportunities for its workforce. 
Community 
Commitment to being a good citizen, 
protecting public health and respecting 
business ethics. 
Human Rights 
Effectiveness in respecting fundamental 
human rights conventions. 
Product Responsibility 
Capacity to produce quality goods and 
services, incorporating the customer’s health 
and safety, integrity and data privacy. 
Governance 
Management 
Commitment to and effectiveness in 
following best practice corporate governance 
principles 
Shareholders 
Effectiveness in the equal treatment of 
shareholders and the use of anti-takeover 
devices. 
CSR Strategy 
Reflects a company’s practices to 
communicate that it incorporates the 
economic (financial), social and 
environmental dimensions in its day-to-day 
decision-making processes. 
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Appendix 3: Graphical representation of the correlation between bank leverage      
and CSR 
 





Appendix 4: Results of the multicollinearity test using VIF statistics 
 
Source: Computed and extracted from Stata 15 Statistical Analysis Software by the author; Note: The equation 
1/VIF defines the Tolerance which can also be used as an indicator of multicollinearity and as a rule of thumb a 
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Pooled_OLS_ RE  FE  
Constant  0.748** 1.156*** 2.201*** 
  (0.286) (0.202) (0.265) 
CSR  0.0101 -0.0167 -0.0299 
  (0.0215) (0.0176) (0.0230) 
SIZE  0.00142 0.00259 -0.000517 
  (0.00184) (0.00223) (0.00903) 
PROF  -0.106 0.111 0.317 
  (0.336) (0.269) (0.256) 
TANG  0.769*** 0.235 -0.926*** 
  (0.258) (0.205) (0.286) 
GRWTH  -0.570*** -0.464*** -0.318*** 
  (0.165) (0.113) (0.109) 
ARISK  -0.591** -0.170* -0.184** 
  (0.275) (0.0894) (0.0832) 
DIV  -0.0198** -0.0176* -0.00769*** 
  (0.00734) (0.00920) (0.00216) 
TAX  -0.208** -0.0572 0.0265 
  (0.0758) (0.0348) (0.0486) 
GDP  0.00222** 0.00151*** 0.00105** 
  (0.000977) (0.000481) (0.000419) 
INF  0.270 0.454*** 0.382*** 
  (0.164) (0.108) (0.109) 
R-squared  0.613 0.208 0.329 
OV Test 13.48 [0.0000] - - 
Wald Test - 133.42 [0.0000] - 
F-Test - - 24.17 [0.0000] 
Number of observations  220  220  220   
Number of Banks   28 28  28  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses ():***,** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
Appendix 6: Results of the Hausman Specification Test 
 
Source: Computed and extracted from Stata 15 Statistical Analysis Software by the author 
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Appendix 7: Stata 15 Statistical Analysis Software regression codes 
Command Regression Code 
Pooled OLS Regression  reg lev l.csr l.size l.prof l.tang l.grwth l.arisk div 
gdp l.tax inf,  vce(cluster panelvar) 
Ramsey RESET Test 
reg lev l.csr l.size l.prof l.tang l.grwth l.arisk div 
gdp l.tax inf,  vce(cluster panelvar) 
ovtest 
Multicollinearity Test Using VIF Statistics 
reg lev l.csr l.size l.prof l.tang l.grwth l.arisk div 
gdp l.tax inf,  vce(cluster panelvar) 
vif 
Hausman Test 
xtreg lev csr size prof tang grwth arisk div gdp 
tax inf, re 
estimate store re 
xtreg lev csr size prof tang grwth arisk div gdp 
tax inf, fe 
estimate store fe 
hausman fe re 
Fixed Effects Regression (Model 1) 
xtreg lev l.csr l.size l.prof l.tang l.grwth l.arisk 
div gdp l.tax inf, re vce(cluster panelvar) 
Fixed Effects Regression (Model 1a) 
xtreg lev l.env l.soc l.gov l.size l.prof l.tang 
l.grwth l.arisk div gdp l.tax inf, re vce(cluster 
panelvar) 
Fixed Effects Regression (Model 2) 
xtreg lev l.csr l.size l.prof l.tang l.grwth l.arisk 
div gdp l.tax inf csrsize, fe vce(cluster panelvar) 
Fixed Effects Regression (Model 2a) 
xtreg lev l.env l.soc l.gov l.size l.prof l.tang 
l.grwth l.arisk div gdp l.tax inf envsize socsize 
govsize, fe vce(cluster panelvar) 
 
 
